Abstract In Network cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, agents are not able to base their behavior on the "whole network status" but have to follow certain "beliefs" as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This behavior constitutes the main interest of this paper. To this end, we quantify and characterize the set of beliefs that support cooperation of such agents. Assuming that they are engaged in a differentiated Cournot competition and that they equally split the worth produced, we characterize the set of coalitional beliefs that support core non-emptiness and thus guarantee stability of the Network.
Introduction
Game Theory has nowadays become a frequent research tool to approach Network Science. Ideas like Nash equilibrium, price of anarchy and stability, cost allocation, transferable utilities, coalition formation, core, mechanism design, to name a few, are commonly used not only to understand the behavior of complex network phenomena but also to control and efficiently design such networks. See, for example, Chapter 10 in [1] for a recent survey. Under the above setting, usually there exists an underlying network in which some agents (or otherwise stated, players, nodes, firms, etc.) are linked according to certain relationships and compete following specific rules in order to optimize a self-interested utility (price, bandwidth, network flow, etc.). However, as many of the real life problems map to large and complex networks [2] , our bounded computational ability and known intractability results [3, 4] restrict our potential to fully unfold and understand coalition formation in networks.
Due to this complex environment network agents are not able to base their behavior on the "whole network status" but have to follow certain beliefs as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This behavior has gained a lot of attention and such agents are extensively used in Network science [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . These agents constitute the main interest of this paper. To this end, we quantify and characterize the set of beliefs that support cooperation of such agents in a network. In order to illustrate our ideas, we force the agents to compete under a Cournot competition. We also agree that in order to conceive of a group of fully cooperating agents we will use a complete graph (clique). We suppose that at the begining of the competition all the agents, say N, are fully cooperating and form a large clique or in game theoretic terms, the grand coalition. We then try to answer the following Basic Question: Which are the coalitional beliefs of the agents that support network stability?
By network stability we mean the situation in which every agent cooperates with every other agent and no relationship between any two is broken (thus no edge is missing from the graph -network).
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows: In section 2 we present our model, in sections 3, 4 we present our results and in section 5 we conclude.
The model
Consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, · · · , n} which are the nodes of a graph G. Suppose that these agents are engaged in a cooperative game which we will soon define. Whenever two agents l, m, 1 ≤ l, m ≤ n, cooperate, we draw an edge between the corresponding nodes in G. The graph describing all the cooperations between all the agents in N forms the network. It is clear that when every agent cooperates with every other, then the network is modeled by the complete graph (clique) of n nodes. In this case we say that the agents form the grand coalition. It is also clear that, unless otherwise stated, every non empty subset of agents S ⊂ N that fully cooperates also forms a complete subgraph, of G, with s = |S| nodes. Let P j denote a partition of the outsiders, N \ S, such that j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n − s} and P j = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S j }, where 1≤i≤j S i = P j and S l ∩ S m = ∅, ∀ l = m, 1 ≤ l, m ≤ j. We call P j , a coalition structure with j coalitions. Let s r = |S r |, r = 1, 2, · · · , j, denote the number of agents in S r .
The N agents are put together in order to cooperate under a Cournot competition, in which everyone must decide how much "product" to produce, all decisions have to be made at the same time, and each one must take its competitors into account. Each agent i ∈ N, produces with the cost function C(q i ) = c · q i and with price function P i = a − q i − γ n j=1,j =i q j , where q i is the quantity produced. The form of P i implies that we use product differentiation in the Cournot competition where a > 0 is a constant, c, 0 < c < a, the per unit cost and γ ∈ (−1, 1] a non zero constant. Let v P j j (S) denote the total worth (or value or profit or payoff) of coalition S when S faces coalition structure P j . Finally, in order to simplify the exposition assume, without loss of generality, that S = {1, 2, · · · , s},
Consider now the following scenario: a non empty set S ⊂ N of agents considers not cooperating with the rest and wishes to deviate or in other words disconnect from the initial network (grand coalition). This would result in a split of the network into (at least) two disconnected components, the complete subgraph induced by S = {1, 2, · · · , s} and the rest of the network denoted by N \ S (the outsiders). Since the consideration of S not to cooperate constitutes a threat for network stability (the grand coalition will break if S manages to deviate), decisions have to be made as to whether specific actions should take place. What would S finally do? The reasonable thing to do is for the agents of S to calculate their worth, a task not trivial at all. This is because their worth depends on how the rest of the network would act. Namely, it depends on the coalition structure that the outsiders N \ S will form.
The worth function
As stated above, we now consider the scenario where a coalition S contemplates breaking off from the grand coalition. What are the coalitional beliefs of the agents in S? In order to answer this we have to reason on what the outsiders, n − s = |N \ S|, will do. Assume that agents in S believe that the rest will form j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n−s} coalitions. Since agents compete with each other, everyone faces an optimization problem, the solution to which gives the Nash equilibria describing the worth of each agent in the network when the grand coalition forms. Every agent needs to maximize his worth which is given by the formula: worth=(price-cost)×quantity produced. Since agents in every coalition are symmetric, in order to select how much quantity they should produce, they face respectively the following optimization problems:
One of the ideas that underlies the above problems is that due to symmetry we do not have to solve the same problem for every agent in the same coalition. Instead we can treat every different coalition as a "super agent" and solve the problem concerning him. This approach is common in such problems (see for example [10] ). We have the following Theorem 1 If coalition S faces structure P j and γ > −1 n−1 , then there exist real numbers λ 0 , · · · , λ j such that the worth of S is
where
Proof: For the proof we will need the condition K : γ >
which guarantees the existence of Cournot equilibrium when γ ∈ (−1, 0). The first-order conditions for the optimal quantities of the members of S read
Notice that due to (intra-coalitional) symmetry, the following must hold
. . .
s w . Letting 1 s = s 0 , the system to solve for is
Considering ith and kth equations of (3) we have
Multiplying by γ, using kth equation of (3) and the first equation of (4) we get,
. Observe that A i > 0 (due to condition K).
1 From now on we will use both s and s 0 to denote the number of agents in S.
Let us now compute the worth of S. Recall that
Define λ k = γs k −2γ +2, k = 0, 1, ..., j. By using (4) and (5) for i = 0, and the multiplicities of q's for each y i in (2) we get the following two equations
Using (6, 7, 8) we get the theorem.
Using Theorem 1 we have the following Corollary 1 When the grand coalition forms, the total worth of the network is
Corollary 1 can be very useful in the following sense. Since, upon cooperation, the agents split the profit equally, when the grand coalition forms each of them will receive
. This means that no agent would accept deviating from the grand coalition and join a smaller one if he did not first ensure that he would receive at least more than , then no agent likes to deviate and thus the grand coalition forms and the network does not break.
When the grand coalition forms it is said that the core of the game is non-empty and since we would like the whole network to be stable and not to break into disconnected components, we have to characterize the set of coalitional beliefs that support core non-emptiness. So it is of special interest to study the core of the above game. This is the subject of the following section.
The core
Before saying anything about the core of the game, let us examine the impact of the distribution of (s 1 , · · · , s j ) on v P j j (S). This is useful in case agents in S need to follow a trend in their reasoning. When γ ∈ (0, 1) we have the following Proposition 1 For a fixed j, the optima of v 
Let h(s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s j−1 ) denote the right hand side of (9) . To find the vector of (s 1 , ..., s j−1 ) that minimizes (9) ), so we have (i). In a similar way we can also prove (ii).
Proposition 1 gives the deviating agents a first belief about their potential worth
Answer 2: If the number of coalitions that outsiders form is fixed, say j, then the worth of the deviating agents, s, is minimized (hence the network is less likely to break) when the n−s agents split equally among the j coalitions; and the worth of s is maximized when j − 1 coalitions have one member and one coalition has n − s − (j − 1) members.
The above answer gives in a way an incentive to the deviating agents, meaning that a coalition of agents has a lower incentive to deviate when its opponents are split equally among j (see Fig. 1 ).
Another look at how agents in S might reason is given by the following Proposition 2 When γ = 1, if a coalition S believes that the n−s outsiders will form more than j * (n, s) = 2( n s − 1) coalitions, then S will not deviate from the grand coalition.
Proof: Before giving the proof we make the following observation. As said earlier, since the agents upon cooperation split the profit equally, they know that when the network does not break they are going to receive
each. On the other hand, agents belonging to a deviating coalition S, after calculating their worth, know that upon deviation they are going to receive
, then no agent in S would like to deviate. Now returning to the proof, from (5) for γ = 1 we get
, 0 ≤ i ≤ j. Hence the value of S is independent of the size of coalitions of the outsiders but depends only on their number, i.e. v A more thorough look at how agents in S might think is given by the following Theorem 2 Assume γ ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a j * (n, s, γ), such that the core is non-empty for all j > j * (n, s, γ) and all corresponding P j .
Proof: We seek conditions for the inequality
to hold:
Since 0 < γ ≤ 1 the sum can not exceed j, so for j * (n, s, γ) = ζ the core is non empty for all j > j * (n, s, γ). We now have to show that n − s > ζ. But it can be easily proven by induction on s, 0 < s < n that for fixed n, n > 1 and γ ∈ (0, 1], ζ < n − s. And since for every s < n, ζ > 0, we have the theorem. Theorem 2 gives, in a computational efficient way, a belief as to how agents in S might think when considering deviation from the Network and thus constitutes another answer to our Basic Question (see also Fig. 1 
):
Answer 4: When γ ∈ (0, 1], the network does not break provided that agents in S believe the outsiders will form a structure with a sufficiently large number of coalitions (> j * ).
Using the formula for j * (n, s, γ) we can prove proposition 2 in a different way by plugging γ = 1 and get j * (n, s, 1) = ζ| γ=1 = 2( n s − 1) as expected. Another perspective of the beliefs of agents in S is given by the following Theorem 3 If γ ∈ (−1, 0) and condition K holds, then the core is nonempty for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n − s and all P j .
Proof: The inequality
or using the definitions
, it suffices to show that
The maximum value of the term
appears at s h = 1 for all but one h (remember that now γ < 0). It suffices then to show that the left hand side of the last inequality is greater than the corresponding maximum value of the sum. So we must show
or that
Since j−1 1−γ
Conclusions
In this paper we forced a set of n agents to compete under a differentiated Cournot competition and by imagining their full cooperation as a complete graph we studied the various beliefs that support core non-emptiness and thus network stability. Fixing the number of coalitions that outsiders form to say j coalitions, we proved that the worth of the deviating agents, s, is minimized (hence the network is less likely to break) when the n − s agents split equally among the j coalitions; and the worth of s is maximized when j−1 coalitions have one member and one coalition has n−s−(j−1) members. Given the above, we proved that when γ > 0 the network does not break, provided the agents of a deviant coalition believe their opponents will form a sufficiently large number of coalitions. On the other hand, if γ < 0 and γ > −1 n−1
, the network does not break irrespective of the beliefs of the deviant coalition, so no agent will consider deviating. Finally, we proved that when γ = 1, the deviating agents, in order to calculate their worth and thus decide what to do, must only worry about how many coalitions are going to be formed by the outsiders. On the left, when γ ∈ (0, 1] the network does not break provided that agents in S believe the outsiders will form a large > j * number of coalitions. In this figure we illustrate the case where n = 46, s = 4, and γ = 0.9, for which j * (46, 4, 0.9) ≈ 4.57. So when the outsiders split into 5 coalitions the network does not break. On the right, when γ ∈ (−1, 0), the network does not break irrespective of what S might think.
